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The bodies of power of all levels throughout the post-Soviet environment face a major challenge of
learning to be accountable for their actions (or the failure to act), to take adequate timely steps and,
most important, to tell the truth to their peoples. The experience of perestroika and the current years,
from Chornobyl to the Kursk submarine, has proved that far from all leaders manage to respond to the
challenge appropriately.
In the last days of August 2000 the Pervomaisky district of the Mykolayiv region, Ukraine, was
announced by President Kuchma to be an environmental catastrophe area. The presidential decree
assigned the area a special status for one year, till September 1, 2001. The decision followed
proliferation of an unknown disease, never registered in Ukraine before, that had stricken four villages
of the Pervomaisky district: Boleslavchik, Chausove, Pidhirya and Michurine. Officially the disease
was identified as toxicodermia.
Following the President's order, the Cabinet of Ministers appointed an ad hoc commission led by Vice
Prime Minister Mykola Zhulynsky to deal with the issue. Members of the commission, supposed to
find a solution for the problem, included Minister of the Environment and Natural Resources Ivan
Zayets, Minister of the Emergencies Vasyl Durdynets, Minister of Health Care Vitaly Moskalenko,
representatives of other relevant ministries, departments and academia.
The affected residents of the area were diagnosed as suffering from acute chemical poisoning, though
specialists were unable to identify the agent. There have been several versions as to what caused the
accident. According to one of the hypotheses, a group of scientists led by Deputy Director of the
Institute of Ecological Hygiene and Toxicology Prof. Roman Sova found that the soil and water on site
contained formic-aldehyde, nitrocoumpounds, and excessive amounts of fluorine. Besides, the amount
of these agents found in potable water reservoirs and soil in villages located between the Yuzhnyi Boog
and the Syniukha is 10 to 15 times above normal.
Remarkably, various officials quoted different numbers of people affected by the disease. While the
parliament's official newspaper Holos Ukrainy referred to 410 affected persons (Holos Ukrainy,
September 1, 2000), later on smaller figures were given. Minister of the Emergencies Vasyl Durdynets
quoted the findings of the Interdepartmental Commission, established to investigate the causes of the
disaster: the disease stroke 378 persons, 170 adults and 208 children (Den, September 5, 2000).
The environmental disaster highlighted some non-environmental facts of relations between the
government and the citizens. The challenge reflected the failure of interaction between the power-
holders and the society, and inability or unwillingness of governmental institutions to act in a
transparent and prompt manner. Generally, the Pervomaisk tragedy showed that the bureaucracy failed
again.
Again, the society has been left on its own to observe in astonishment the total inaction and
helplessness of Ukrainian officials. The fact is that the first information about the unknown disease was
published on June 15, 2000 (!), but virtually nothing was done in two months to cope with the situation.
Instead, there were traditional efforts to hide the facts. Information about new cases of the disease
seemed to gain no attention of the Ukrainian official establishment.
Meanwhile, Ukraine observed the fire at the Ostankino TV tower in Moscow, mourned the tragedy of
the Kursk submarine (in a way, similar to the developments in the Pervomaisk district in terms of the
authorities' failure to respond adequately, as a remarkable display of passiveness and the lack of
transparency of the government, and attempts to hide information from the society). However, the
suffering of Boleslavchik residents looked too insignificant compared to the recent major accidents in
Russia that attracted broad attention of the international community.
The two past months were marked by massive proliferation of the unknown disease in the Pervomaisky
district. Yet, it took the local and national officials quite a long time to start paying attention to lives
and health of their fellow countrymen.
The events in the Mykolayiv region and the authorities' actions looked notoriously similar to the
reaction to the Chornobyl catastrophe on April 26, 1986. Both then and now, the authorities' reactions
were too late, chaotic and inconsistent. The difference was only the level of freedom of access to
information, though sometimes controversial. However, it should be noted that residents of the affected
villages were mainly cut off the information flow, as local authorities would simply switch off the local
TV transmitter when national news programs were broadcast.
The information that arrived from the site of the disaster resembled reports from a battlefield, but it did
not seem to impress many officials, and even fewer were inclined to act. However, a vivid "chain
reaction" among bureaucrats started at the end of August when President Kuchma went to inspect the
area personally. The public announcement of the official version of the causes of the disaster on August
29 coincided with the President's trip to the environmental disaster area, and clearly demonstrated the
inertia in the actions of national and local authorities, inherited from the command-administrative
system. The chronology of the process showed that a for number of officials the priority is, as before,
keeping their seats rather than acting promptly and adequately to the challenge.
Disclosure and analysis of causes of the tragedy also displayed a good deal of inconsistency in the
official reaction. Different governmental agencies offered at least two working versions of causes of
the disease and contamination of the area. One of the quoted causes was closely linked to activities of
the Armed Forces, while the other, as President Kuchma's press secretary Oleksandr Martynenko put it,
saw the disaster as a result of excessive use of nitrates by a South Korean company that had rented land
in the district (Holos Ukrainy, September 1, 2000). However, final conclusions were to be made by the
special commission, Mr. Martynenko remarked. No more specific information was offered. However,
preliminary tests did not prove the version about contamination of the Pervomaisky district of the
Mykolayiv region with nitrates, according to Mykhailo Troitsky, head of the radiological department of
the Mykolayiv Regional Design and Technology Center for Soil Protection and Product Quality
(Molod Ukrainy, September 1, 2000).
The final official conclusion has not been announced yet, and the debates over the announcement of
investigation results show striking diversity of expert opinions. For the first time in over ten (!) weeks
after the epidemics began, an opinion about causes of the disease was offered by Ukrainian medical
authorities on August 30, 2000. According to the official statement of the Ministry of Health Care, the
most likely cause of the disease identified as toxicodermia was "the arrival to the living environment of
chemical substances from military sites and their territories, contaminated with technological wastes"
(Silski Visti, August 31, 2000). According to the Ministry of Health Care, the diagnosis for the affected
population was the evidence of poisoning with a chemical substance, but it was unclear which one.
Logically, one may assume that the army activity was a direct cause of the environmental disaster -
particularly given the fact that the soil on the site contained chemical elements that were markers of
products of decay of missile fuel or its oxidants.
The Ukrainian military officials, however, were reluctant to accept the claims and take responsibility
for the disaster, choosing to stay in the "information shadow". Specifically, commenting on the
statement made by the Ministry of Health Care about the role of the military sites in the environmental
problem, military officials, according to Chief State Sanitary Doctor Olga Bobyliova, reacted to the
medical request of information with a note indicating that no extraordinary situations had occurred, and
no cases of disease were registered in the military unit deployed near the site of the accident.
Noteworthy, the Ukrainian medical specialists involved are still unclear about the way of the poisonous
chemicals to the water and the soil. However, experts suggest that the event might have been caused by
the "color metal rush" currently experienced by Ukraine whose impoverished population dig into
abandoned industrial sites in search for metal debris. In economically depressed areas where salaries
and wages have not been paid for months, where electricity and gas cut-offs are frequent, gathering and
selling any metal things is a major source of income for a "small Ukrainian" (as Prime Minister Victor
Yushchenko refers to his ordinary fellow citizens). Hence, according to some experts' version, the
"metal hunters" happened to dig into a pit where the debris of an old destroyed missile launcher had
been buried. Although this is only one of the versions, if it is proved to be correct, the "Ukrainian
toxicodermia" can be regarded as a primarily social disease caused by the facts similar to the ones that
have resulted in unprecedented spread of TB on the verge of the XXI century. The general cause is the
dramatic deterioration of the social and economic conditions of living and the failure of governmental
institutions supposed to be responsible for safety of the society in general and such dangerous sites in
particular.
However, proving any of the versions is likely to be a hard thing to do. Minister of Defence Army
General Oleksandr Kuzmuk refuted the conclusions of the Ministry of Health Care about any role the
military sites might have played in causing the massive spread of the disease in the Mykolayiv region.
As Minister Kuzmuk stated at the session of the governmental commission, he did not believe that
missile fuel decay products might have caused the multiple toxicodermia cases. In his opinion, having
made public that version the Ministry of Health Care lacked solid proof to support its claims. In order
to finally identify the nature of the disease in the Mykolayiv region it was necessary to open the missile
waste dump. However, as staff officer of the 43rd Missile Army Col. Volodymyr Shapoval stressed in
his interview to the UNIAN press agency, "conclusions made by the Ministry of Health Care about the
involvement of the debris of the military missiles in the disease will remain only a supposition until the
dump is open" (Molod Ukrainy, August 31, 2000).
The military officials' protests against the medical professionals' working hypotheses resembled the
Ukrainian Armed Forces leadership's reaction to the accident on April 20, 2000, when a training
missile fired at the military exercise in the vicinity of Kyiv hit a block of flats in the town of Brovary.
Then, three civilians - two women and a man - were killed, and major damage was done to property
and apartments, but the Ministry of Defense kept denying any charges that the accident had been
caused by their stray missile. On April 21, 2000, head of the Information Group of the MOD Press
Service Igor Khalyavinsky stated that possibility was excluded completely. But as it was increasingly
difficult to deny the facts, on April 24 the military officials publicly admitted responsibility for the
accident and proceeded with traditional "organizational conclusions", i.e., firing some military
bureaucrats deemed guilty.
Something similar could be observed in the Pervomaisky accident. Yet, it seems that President Kuchma
is not inclined to share Minister Kuzmuk's "optimism", though he also is not sure that the Ministry of
Health Care is right in explaining the massive cases of disease as a result of proliferation of chemical
agents from contaminated military sites. Even if this hypothesis is proven and accepted, the blame will
not be with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but with the no longer existing army of the collapsed Soviet
Union. The territory currently affected by the disease was the Soviet missile launcher site. While the
launchers were destroyed, their silos remained, and the area has never been properly cleaned.
On August 31, President Kuchma was reported to have written a letter to his Russian counterpart
Vladimir Putin regarding the accident, explaining that according to one of the hypotheses of the
environmental disaster was the impact on human bodies of missile fuel and its components that might
have remained in one of the missile waste dumps in the area. As the letter suggests, Ukraine still lacks
relevant information about missile waste burial places, as well as about other radioactive and chemical
waste dumps that are environmental and technogenic threats to this country and the entire region.
Therefore, the Ukrainian president asked the Russian party to assist in the investigation and provide
relevant Ukrainian governmental agencies with adequate information about missile burial places as
well as radioactive and chemical material dumps made in Ukraine before the end of 1991.
Hence, a rather sad conclusion comes to mind: Ukrainian officials simply do not have adequate
information about the dangerous Soviet military legacy on Ukraine's territory. The existing waste
dumps are not secure, not guarded and their safety has not been tested. Moreover, it is unclear who is
supposed to take responsibility for the "time mine" that can explode virtually anywhere and anytime.
Hence, there is no guarantee that something similar to the Pervomaisk disaster will not occur again.
In this context it is worth noting yet another warning and public reproach made by the President to the
government for the latter's inadequate operation. Speaking at the session of the governmental
commission in Pervomaisk, Leonid Kuchma stressed that "the government must draw adequate
conclusions immediately". In his view, liability for the spread of the epidemics "must be with the
Cabinet of Ministers and, in particular, Minister of Health Care Vitaly Moskalenko" (Molod Ukrainy,
August 31, 2000). However, the emphasis was not only on the failure of the Ministry of Health Care.
Leonid Kuchma stated, among other things, that the administrative reform "has not made the
government any better; on the contrary, it has become even more difficult to knock to" (Molod
Ukrainy, August 31, 2000).
According to Minister of Health Care Vitaly Moskalenko, preliminary data about the causes of
toxicodermia are to be prepared by September 12, 2000. However, in general, notwithstanding the final
conclusions to be made by the Interdepartmental Commission of Ukrainian and foreign experts, one
thing seems to be evident: the society has been given yet another reason to view the government's
carelessness and inertia. Should the relevant governmental agencies have reacted to the challenge
immediately, the number of affected persons could have been much smaller. However, today the
society is still unclear about the agency that should take responsibility for public safety, and the issue
of responsibility and accountability of the government remains its most sensitive weak
point.P.S.Speaking at a press conference on September 11, 2000, head of the General Military Medical
Department of the Ministry of Defense Lt. Gen. of the medical service Volodymyr Bilyi who led the
group of military medical specialists investigating the causes of the environmental disaster in the
Pervomaisk district announced that the military medical specialists had found no evidence of chronical
intoxication with missile fuel components, specifically, with heptyl. Instead, in his words, 80 percent of
the local population were "infected" with strong psycho-emotional stress caused by the journalists.
Minister of Defense Oleksandr Kuzmuk was also inclined to blame the journalists. As he told the
Interfax-Ukraina news agency in Kharkiv, the fact that the MoD provided assistance to those suffering
from toxicodermia did not mean that the military took responsibility for the spread of the disease.
